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Human Capital and Conflict Management in the Entrepreneur-Venture 
Capitalist Relationship: The Entrepreneurs’ Perspective 
 
ABSTRACT 
Entrepreneurs’ human capital is important in the entrepreneur-venture capitalist (E-VC) 
relationship where conflict between the two parties is almost inevitable. However, how 
human capital affects entrepreneurs’ responses to conflict is under explored. Adopting a 
qualitative analysis, this study integrates the human capital and conflict management literature 
to examine the factors that cause conflict in the E-VC relationship in China and to investigate 
how entrepreneurs with different degrees of human capital respond to conflict. Our findings 
show communication barriers, and different goals and value systems are the main sources of 
conflict between Chinese entrepreneurs and foreign VCs. Entrepreneurs with start-up 
experience are more likely to adopt collaborative and competing strategies and hence have a 
more positive and productive attitude towards conflict with VCs, whereas inexperienced 
entrepreneurs tend to use passive accommodating and avoiding approaches that create 
problems in the E-VC relationship.  
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Human Capital and Conflict Management in the Entrepreneur-Venture 
Capitalist Relationship: The Entrepreneurs’ Perspective  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern venture capital is recognized as an important catalyst for fostering entrepreneurship, 
innovation and economic growth, especially in emerging economies  (Lerner, 1999). Venture 
capital firms seek to support enterprises that progress within a relatively short space of time 
from start-ups or small beginnings to high growth firms ( Shane, 2008).  Value-adding 
activities by venture capitalists (VCs) can result in higher survival rates for investee firms 
compared to similar ‘non-venture capital’ ventures (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). Yet, the 
input of VCs does not always result in positive outcomes (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000), and 
failure or weak performance in investee firms is frequently explained by conflict in the 
entrepreneur-venture capitalist (E-VC) relationship (Higashide and Birley, 2002; Yitshaki, 
2008). Indeed, conflict is almost unavoidable in a relationship often defined by control rather 
than trust (Das and Teng, 2001) and where power asymmetry typically favours the investors 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The root of much conflict is a failure to agree on the goals to be 
achieved by an investee firm or the strategy to be adopted in pursuit of those goals (Jehn and 
Mannix, 2001). 
Although there is growing academic interest in the development of venture capital industries 
in emerging economies (Ahlstrom, Bruton and Yeh, 2007), the majority of these studies have 
been conducted from the perspective of VCs; very few studies have taken into account the 
views of entrepreneurs or CEOs in venture capital-backed firms (Ehrlich, et al., 1994; 
Yitshaki, 2008). The causes and consequences of conflict still require greater academic 
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scrutiny, (Manigart and Sapienza, 2000; Zacharakis et al., 2010), and we view the role of 
entrepreneurs’ human capital as critical in this context. If entrepreneurs and VCs can build a 
productive relationship based on mutual respect and trust, this should enhance a portfolio 
firm’s prospects of survival and/or success and, at the same time, increase the chance of a 
healthy return for the venture capital fund. 
Conflict resolution thus benefits investee firms and their backers, and generates wealth in the 
wider economy. Specifically, we contend that the human capital of entrepreneurs gives them 
the capacity to face the challenges of developing their firms under VCs’ supervision. 
However, our knowledge of the interaction between human capital and conflict management 
is limited. To address this gap in the existing literature, we focus on two research questions:  
1. What are the sources of conflict in the E-VC relationship, with particular 
reference to cultural factors?  
2. How does the human capital of entrepreneurs affect their responses to 
managing conflict with VCs, especially foreign VCs?  
China represents an interesting research setting. Its venture capital industry has been one of 
the fastest growing in the global venture capital market (Ahlstrom et al., 2007). Foreign VCs 
have played an increasingly important role in financing domestic new ventures, particularly in 
the high-technology sphere; foreign venture capital firms funded over 52 per cent of venture 
capital investments by number in China in 2010, representing 71 per cent of venture capital 
investment by value (Cai and Song, 2010). Our empirical research was conducted in Beijing 
and Shanghai, cities where large numbers of new ventures have been financed by venture 
capital (Cai and Song, 2010). Yet, this form of capital (whether from domestic or foreign 
sources) remains in short supply for many Chinese firms, and its impact on investee firms is 
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under explored (Xiao, 2011). It is therefore imperative that firms in receipt of venture capital 
are able to respond appropriately to conflict in the E-VC relationship. 
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it adds a new dimension 
to existing studies by investigating how the human capital of entrepreneurs leads to the 
adoption of different strategies in the management of conflict with VCs. Second, our analysis 
is based upon in-depth interviews with nine entrepreneurs in receipt of venture capital funding 
hence it complements previous studies conducted from the perspective of VCs; we offer new 
insights into how conflict stems from different cultural contexts of entrepreneurs and also 
their differing characteristics. Third, we put forward a series of propositions that enhance our 
understanding of the complexity of the E-VC relationship. Finally, our findings have 
important implications for all those seeking to maximize the positive impact of venture capital 
on entrepreneurial ventures. 
 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
Conflict: Sources and Resolution 
 
Conflict refers to a situation where the parties in a relationship are aware of, yet still seek to 
occupy, a position that is incompatible or irreconcilable with the wishes of others (Boulding, 
1963; Jehn and Mannix, 2001). As stated earlier, conflict is almost unavoidable in the E-VC 
relationship (Higashide and Birley, 2002), commonly linked to a failure to agree on goals or 
the strategy to secure those goals (Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Zacharakis et al., 2010). However, 
Yitshaki (2008) argues that conflict in VC provision stems from three broad (and interlinked) 
sources: ‘contractual’ – covering a whole range of perceived contract violations, not just 
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disputes over the best way to secure the goals laid down in the term sheet but also 
disagreements on the support provided by a venture fund, the imposition of a new 
management team, the timing of any VC exit, and so on (Parhankangas and Landström, 
2004); ‘contextual’ – usually stemming from differences in perception over the competitive 
environment facing the investee firm or the firm’s level of performance; and ‘procedural’ – 
largely relating to communication issues.  
The role of different cultural contexts in creating conflict has been emphasised in both the 
general literature in this field (Tjsovold, Law and Sun, 2006) and also in VC-focused studies 
(Yitshaki, 2008). Cultural diversities can lead to procedural conflict between Chinese 
entrepreneurs and foreign VCs, for example, as Western VCs tend to concentrate on building 
relationships with the CEO, whereas their Chinese counterparts also maintain contact with 
senior and middle-ranked managers (Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2007). At the strategic level, 
contractual conflict might ensue in cases where indigenous entrepreneurs resent the 
imposition of short-term targets by western VCs, rather than the longer-term, collectivist 
approach favoured by their Asian counterparts (Wright et al., 2005).  
The literature in conflict management has proposed four approaches to resolving conflict - 
collaborating, competing, accommodating and avoiding (Deutsch, 1973; Thomas, 1976). The 
collaborative approach implies that one party attempts to work with the other in an effort to 
find a mutually acceptable solution; it requires the parties in conflict to be open, to share 
information and to be aware of their differences (Wang, Jing, and Klossek, 2007). This 
strategy creates shared understanding, and it usually results in positive and constructive 
outcomes (Yitshaki, 2008). The competing approach is employed when one party is resolute 
in what s/he believes and wants. This strategy implies that one party holds a position of 
power, expertise or strength and thus a high level of assertiveness; the needs and expectations 
of the other party are sometimes ignored (Rahim, 2002). The accommodating approach occurs 
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where one party makes sacrifices to satisfy the requirements of the other; again, this may 
reflect a power-based relationship. Finally, the avoiding approach attempts to smooth over 
conflicts and minimize discussion of them (Chen, et al., 2005); this may involve turning away 
from conflict or even refusing to acknowledge its existence.  
Human Capital 
 
Human capital gives entrepreneurs a reservoir of skills, knowledge and abilities to draw upon 
as they face ongoing challenges (Cooper, Estes and Allen, 2004; Keong and Mei, 2010). 
Despite its importance, research on the relationship between human capital and conflict 
management has been limited (De Vries and Shields, 2006; Envick, 2005), especially in the 
E-VC relationship (Wright, Low and Davidson, 2001). Moreover, scholars have concentrated 
largely on establishing the psychological traits required by entrepreneurs in times of conflict 
(Cooper and Lucas, 2006), for example: Timmons (1999) argues that successful entrepreneurs 
have the ability in their DNA to recover from adversity. However, we endorse the view of 
Morris (2002) that the sustainability of a venture depends more heavily on behavioural 
capabilities than psychological characteristics.  
We view human capital as a spectrum of skills and knowledge with varying degrees of 
transferability. The acquisition of knowledge is a long-term process by which “entrepreneurs 
transform experience into knowledge in disparate ways” (Politis, 2005: 408). As well as 
his/her formal education, an entrepreneur’s previous start-up experience, knowledge of the 
industry and market, past employment experience, and technical knowledge can affect his/her 
behaviour and strategic decision-making, and, ultimately, firm performance (Bruderl, 
Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992; Bosma, et al., 2004). We share the view that prior 
experience, education and personal background shape the perceptions and mindsets of 
entrepreneurs (Kor, Mahoney, and Michael, 2007), enabling them to make appropriate 
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strategic responses in fast-changing external environments (Huff, 1990) or to develop early 
warning systems to visualize and anticipate future events (Cope, 2010). 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
While a positivist approach has dominated in entrepreneurship research, it is acknowledged 
(McDougall and Oviatt, 2000) that this stance may not have generated meaningful causal laws 
or principles in the context of entrepreneurial activities such as opportunity recognition or 
value creation - key goals of venture capital-backed firms (Shane, 2008). Coviello and Jones 
(2004) called for a more interpretive perspective. Our study answers this call. Drawing on the 
literature from the fields of conflict management and human capital, we utilised a number of 
in-depth case studies to examine how the characteristics of entrepreneurs affect their attitude 
and approach towards conflict, and also their strategic responses to the resolution of conflict. 
Following established procedures for inductive research (Glaser, 1978; Miles and Huberman, 
1994), we captured situated insights into the interaction of entrepreneurs and VCs, as well as 
rich details and thematic descriptions of the E-VC relationship.  
 
Sample Selection 
 
A common feature of interpretive studies is the use of small samples, yet a competent 
theoretical perspective can be developed as long as adequate contextualization is preserved 
(Chapman and Smith, 2002). Researchers have to be pragmatic in choosing participants 
(Reid, Flowers and Larkin 2005), particularly where the topic under investigation is rare, and 
issues of accessibility and willingness to participate are problematic (as was the case here).  
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We used the Thomson Financial Private Equity/Venture Capital Dataset to identify high-tech 
firms in China that had received VC investment. We emailed the research proposal to 200 
firms, but only five firms indicated a willingness to participate. The very low response rate 
was not unexpected, mainly because of a reluctance to talk openly about conflict with VC 
investors. Nonetheless, five cases constituted an acceptable number for the initial round of 
interviews; the data were collected and analysed almost simultaneously, and it was evident 
that it was necessary to gather more data. We asked the initial interviewees to recommend 
other firms that had received VC investment. This snowball or chain sampling strategy 
(Hartley, 1994) secured an additional four participants. We called a halt to the interview 
programme only when we were satisfied that sufficient data had been collected on each of the 
issues of relevance to our research questions. 
In total, nine interviews were completed with entrepreneurs representing venture capital-
backed firms in Beijing and Shanghai. Table 1 provides an anonymised profile of the 
participants, as well as basic information on the firms and their venture capital investors. 
Table 2 captures the previous experience of the interviewees and summarizes the networks 
available to them.  
 
====================== 
INSERT TABLES 1 and 2 HERE 
====================== 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Sources of Conflict in the E-VC Relationship 
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We classify our findings by reference to Yitshaki’s (2008) three sources of conflict 
(contractual; contextual; and procedural), although the boundaries between these categories 
are somewhat blurred. Quotes from the interview transcripts are used sparingly, to emphasize 
key issues or common themes. 
 
Contractual conflict 
 
This type of conflict emanated from disputes over the goals to be pursued by investee firms or 
the level of support provided by VCs. The analysis below shows that some of our sample 
firms avoided this type of conflict, whereas other firms had very different experiences.  
In Firms H and R, both funded by Japanese and domestic VCs, there was a mutual acceptance 
of the goals to be pursued; for example, the CEO of Firm H stressed that: “We [entrepreneur 
and VC Fund] take decisions that achieve reliable and sustainable operations. The VCs have 
to immerse themselves in the firm for the long haul; they could not succeed if they just 
wanted to gamble and pursue short-term interests.”  On similar lines, Firm D held fruitful 
discussions with its VC-backer (the Asian arm of the venture capital unit formed by IDG - a 
global data company), to secure future growth by moving from a funding structure 
appropriate for angel investors into one which complied with NASDAQ listing requirements.  
This level of agreement was not present in Firms K, E and Y. Firms K and E were funded 
partly or wholly by US VC Funds, whereas Firm Y was backed by domestic venture capital. 
The CTO of Firm K pointed to fundamental differences in outlook (“We stood on different 
planets”), sentiments that were echoed by the CEO of Firm E (“These guys [VCs] do not 
position themselves as value-added investors”) and the Deputy General Manager (DGM) in 
Firm Y(“… We have tried to meet the investors’ short-term targets even though we knew that 
this would damage our long-term objectives”). 
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In relation to the support provided, Firm R applauded its Japanese investors for promising 
(and then delivering) introductions to potential customers and suppliers, while Firm D praised 
its VCs for playing to the strengths of both parties: “We are technically-proficient in the 
internet industry, but IDG have much greater expertise on commercial issues.”  By contrast, 
Firms K, E and Y were disappointed with the support offered by their VCs, for example: the 
CEO of Firm E complained about the investors’ failure to provide contacts: “companies that 
we might acquire or who might partner with us”. .  
Firms H, R, N and D could agree on the goals to be pursued with their VC backers, whereas 
Firms K, E and Y could not. There was a similar split of opinion concerning VCs’ support. 
These outcomes cannot be explained solely by ‘East versus West’ disputes, as Firm D dealt 
with the local arm of a US-based VC group while Firm Y was funded by a domestic venture 
capital.  However, it was noticeable that first-time entrepreneurs (K, E and Y) tended to be 
involved in contractual conflict; Firm D was an exception - inexperienced entrepreneurs 
acknowledged the superior skills that the VCs could supply. 
 
Contextual conflict 
 
At the root of contextual conflict are differences in perceptions, attitudes and values between 
entrepreneurs and VCs (Yitshaki 2008). The impact of cultural differences was also a major 
factor under this heading. Contextual conflict was averted in cases where the firm and its VC 
investors shared the same time perspective or business orientation. For example, the CFO of 
Firm R conceded that he and his colleagues sometimes wanted to grasp opportunities 
immediately, whereas their Japanese investors might take a more cautious line: “[Yet, overall] 
… our VCs respect our experience and judgment, and we are lucky to have investors who are 
quite patient in relation to firm growth. The growth demands of US investors would have had 
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a serious impact on the confidence of our top management team.” Likewise in Firm H: “Our 
Japanese investors share similar ideas and philosophies with us, and they do not push us 
aggressively in a certain direction.”  
These positive views can be contrasted with a range of complaints from other interviewees. In 
Firm K, for instance, US VCs challenged the entrepreneurs on both operational issues and 
corporate strategies: “The investors kept telling us how much profit we should generate, what 
we should do daily, what business model we should follow etc. To be honest, I am not happy 
with that.” In Firm Y, the management team was prepared initially to work with the investors 
but this situation deteriorated rapidly: “We accept that the investor can give advice on 
strategies, such as the R&D to be undertaken, yet it is down to us to manage the company.” 
Disputes also arose when the entrepreneurs believed that VC appointees were not familiar 
with the Chinese environment; Firm E complained that: “[a female American-Chinese board 
member] was supposed to guide us, but all her suggestions ended up as being irrelevant or 
inappropriate for the local market.”  
 
Procedural conflict  
 
In relation to procedural issues, various aspects of communication created difficulties for 
investee firms, but we also found several instances of positive interaction in the E-VC 
relationship. By way of illustration, Firm H stressed that “communication is critical”, and 
explained how the founder built up trust with investors by establishing monthly, face-to-face 
meetings, backed up by email or phone contact in the interim. Similarly, the CEO of Firm V 
stated that informal contacts with VCs beforehand ensure that: “… board meetings are 
productive and efficient in delivering decisions”.   
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The experiences of Firms E and D in communicating with their US investors were very 
different. Firm E viewed the VCs’ contribution as lacking empathy, and communications with 
investors were seen as a burden rather than a support mechanism. The CEO of Firm D stated 
that the two IDG board members (both overseas Chinese) commute regularly between 
different continents hence: “… the VC appointees have too many projects, and they have 
limited time to take care of us or to communicate frequently with us.” Such problems were 
not confined to US venture capitalists, as the experience of Firm Y illustrates. Contractual 
agreements with its domestic VC Fund were not supported by procedural guidelines; this 
created a situation of uncertainty and potential future conflict. 
The experiences of five entrepreneurs (Firms I, V, R, H and N) were broadly positive in 
communicating with their investors. The other four participants (Firms K, E, D and Y) had all 
experienced communication problems or other procedural disputes, for example: K and E had 
severe difficulties in communicating with their US VCs, even though both firms had secured 
second-round VC funding, and Firm D felt that the investors did not provide enough 
dedicated local support. The range of discord cited by study participants suggests that 
communication problems are often associated with other, deep-rooted sources of conflict. 
 
Conflict Resolution – the Role of Human Capital 
 
In the ‘contractual’ category, the human capital of the CEO in Firm H enabled him not only to 
obtain VC funding, but also to secure a long-term collaboration that enabled this firm to thrive 
in a very competitive market (Internet 3D).  In this (and other) instances, the entrepreneurs’ 
stock of human capital had enabled them to anticipate and thus prevent conflict. Positive 
intentions to establish the motivations of VC investors and to explore collaboration and/or 
compromise had improved the quality of decision making and generated benefits for all 
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parties. By contrast, contractual conflict was prevalent when such flexibility and adaptability 
was absent, notably in Firms K and E; both firms were convinced that their VCs had 
consistently imposed unrealistic goals and provided inadequate support.  
In relation to contextual factors, Firm H stressed that communication with their Japanese VCs 
was not just about “procedure”, but an important mechanism for maximising the potential of 
the business: “We always prepare for the worst scenario then do our best to solve problems 
together; for instance, in the face of technical problems affecting the firm, we worked together 
to tackle this threat by recruiting specialist employees and seeking technology partners.”  This 
willingness to accept help or advice, based on mutual respect, was also seen in Firm R. The 
CFO explained that the founder’s experience and ability to judge market trends persuaded the 
VCs to allow the firm to dictate its overall growth strategy, yet the CFO admitted that VC 
expertise helped Firm R to improve budget control and investment appraisal. The 
representatives of Firms N, I and V also stressed the importance of accepting advice, albeit 
with limits on their willingness to accede to the demands of VCs. 
Where conflict from contextual sources did arise, it usually stemmed from disagreements on 
the most appropriate strategy to be pursued in the face of rapidly-changing competitive 
environments. This was most evident in Firms K and E (internet-based firms) and Y 
(robotics). The US investors in Firm K imposed their decisions on management: “We had 
arguments over critical strategic decisions, but they had the final call. This definitely harmed 
the mental state of some of the key founders; they have left or are about to leave the firm. The 
more the investors got involved, the more damage they did to the firm”. Likewise, the CEO of 
Firm E accepted that he had lost control to the VCs, and he concluded, with an air of 
resignation, that: “I don’t see any possibility of resolving disputes with the investors. I have 
officially given up, although I am still on the board” 
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The first-time entrepreneurs in Firms K and E (and Firm Y where similar issues were evident) 
did not have the capacity to leverage personal skills and experience to prevent or resolve 
conflict. They maintained a negative attitude towards the VCs and pursued a strategy of 
passive accommodation or outright avoidance towards conflict, and the firms’ prospects were 
seriously compromised. However, not every first-time entrepreneur experienced contextual 
conflict, for example Firm D pursued a collaborative approach that maximised the 
complementary skills of the two parties: “We are technically very sound, but we lack an 
understanding of the wider business environment; [by contrast] our VCs have thorough 
insight into inter- and intra-industry competition, potential markets, legal issues, etc.”   
For procedural disputes, effective communication proved to be a powerful mechanism for 
resolving such conflict. A majority of sample firms (H, I, N, R and V) had benefited from 
frequent and effective exchanges of information; the examples below demonstrate how the 
prior experience of key individuals helped VC-backed firms to lay the foundation for sound 
communications and collaboration with investors. 
The CEO of Firm H argued that his prior entrepreneurial experience and his credibility within 
the VC community had been critical in forging a partnership with the firm’s Japanese 
investors; he had the confidence to share risks as well as opportunities with the VCs: “We 
know that VCs get quite concerned about technical, market and even business model risks 
[hence] we are very frank with them”. The CEO of Firm V also stressed the value of informal 
meetings and contacts with VCs in avoiding conflict and building trust; a key part of this 
process (also cited by Firm H) was to confront any problems quickly.  
By contrast, the firms led by first-time founders had all experienced communication 
problems. For example, Firms K and E had enjoyed some degree of success but had 
encountered severe communication difficulties and faced an uncertain future; and the CEO of 
Firm D felt that communication was hindered by an absence of dedicated local support. These 
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cases confirm that communication problems were often associated with other sources of 
conflict, but we propose that a lack of experience and adaptability were the underlying 
reasons for procedural conflict.  
The evidence indicates that, whatever the source of conflict, experienced entrepreneurs can 
anticipate potential challenges by adopting collaborative (and proactive) strategies that 
enhance trust; this trust facilitates effective communication and reduces the incidence of 
misunderstanding. First-time entrepreneurs lack the requisite experience and personal skills to 
deal with challenges and conflict in the E-VC relationship; they find it very difficult to 
develop a productive relationship with VCs.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In addressing our first research question, we verified that there are different sources of 
conflict in the E-VC relationship, yet our study extends our understanding of those sources to 
the Chinese (and wider) VC environment by taking cultural contexts into account. 
Specifically, we found that, when entrepreneurs and VCs share the same goals or when they 
can negotiate mutually-agreed targets, the relationship tends to be productive and healthy.  In 
contrast, goal divergence between the two parties leads to conflict. Likewise, when 
entrepreneurs value the support received from their VCs, the relationship was generally 
sound, especially in cases where the entrepreneurs and VCs had complementary skills. When 
entrepreneurs perceived that VCs had not fulfilled expectations or supplied anticipated 
benefits, conflict was present. Some VCs were viewed as unwanted external monitors rather 
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than valuable resources; there was also resentment when VCs were closely involved in the 
day-to-day management of firms. Hence, we propose: 
Proposition 1: Goal divergence and perceived deficiencies in the support from VCs are 
likely to lead to contractual conflict in the E-VC relationship. 
 
Contextual conflict in our study stemmed from differing cultural strategic orientations, and 
this encompassed differing attitudes towards investee firm performance. Our interviewees 
confirmed that Asian VCs adopt a longer-term strategic orientation (Wright et al., 2005); a 
number of interviewees were able to build strategic relationships on this basis. Conversely, 
US investors were generally perceived to pay greater attention to short-term sales and profit 
figures, as when Firm E complained of a “lack of empathy” from its investors and 
intervention in day-to-day operations that was “irrelevant or inappropriate for the local 
market”. In such cases, frustrated and demotivated entrepreneurs can lack the capacity to 
think decisively and hence fail to grasp opportunities as they arise. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 2: Differences in cultural strategic orientations and in attitudes towards 
business performance are likely to cause contextual conflict in the E-VC relationship.  
 
The principal source of procedural conflict in our study was difficulties in communications 
between entrepreneurs and VCs (usually, but not exclusively, foreign VCs). We found that 
entrepreneurs who had established a close working relationship with their investors adopt a 
variety of communication strategies, with open discussion and frequent contacts bringing 
mutual, long-term benefits. Entrepreneurs in the latter category were able to create and then 
maintain effective communication systems with their VCs; they were also more prepared to 
embrace a flexible approach towards communication - to make adjustments where necessary, 
to admit past failings and so on. This leads to the following propositions:  
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Proposition 3: The failure to utilise a variety of communication mechanisms is likely to 
result in procedural conflict in the E-VC relationship.  
 
In tackling the second research question i.e. the role of human capital in responding to 
conflict with VCs, we found that first-time entrepreneurs, especially those with limited 
experience and knowledge in managing conflict with foreign VCs, tended to lack flexibility 
and adaptability compared to their more experienced counterparts. First-time entrepreneurs 
generally held negative views towards their VC investors and this led to conflict. Moreover, 
whatever the source of that conflict, it tended to escalate over time. 
In relation to contractual conflict, the prior experience of management proved vital in aligning 
the goals of VCs and investee firms. In addition, when the two parties had different 
perceptions of the strategy to be pursued in achieving those goals, accumulated human capital 
gave experienced entrepreneurs the confidence and credibility to insist upon taking and then 
implementing crucial decisions. In support of this assertion, we suggest that Firms H and N 
adopted a pro-active ‘competing’ approach to conflict resolution; we contend that this 
approach, rather than collaboration, allowed these entrepreneurs to make positive decisions in 
the best interests of the firm, VC investors and the wider economy. We thus take issue with 
the view of Rahim (2002) that a competing/dominating strategy is always a win-lose game in 
which one party pursues his/her own concerns at the other’s expense.  
Another important finding was that, in the event of VCs challenging their strategic goals 
and/or firm performance, both experienced entrepreneurs and start-up players tended to 
employ the competing approach initially. This contention is tempered with two caveats. First, 
experienced entrepreneurs were prepared to seek collaboration with their VCs by establishing 
those areas where skills sets were complementary. Second, and perhaps more significantly, 
the competing method when pursued by first-time entrepreneurs was not as productive as the 
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same approach adopted by experienced entrepreneurs. For example, in the face of conflict 
over growth aspirations and performance, the entrepreneurs in Firms K and Y had relatively 
weak bargaining power; this weakness probably stemmed from a combination of factors, 
including the entrepreneurs’ lack of experience, skills deficiencies in certain areas and their 
perceptions (possibly misplaced) that the VC investors had superior knowledge or power. 
Nonetheless, these individuals tried to resist the wishes of the VCs, until the founder members 
eventually concluded that they had no option but to comply with their investors’ demands and 
to leave the firm (i.e. conflict avoidance). We therefore propose that: 
Proposition 4a: Entrepreneurs with start-up experience are likely to be effective in 
managing contractual conflict, by adopting a collaborative or an assertive competing 
approach. 
Proposition 4b: Inexperienced entrepreneurs are likely to have relatively weak 
bargaining power in the E-VC relationship, and hence pursue a passive accommodating 
or an avoiding approach to contractual conflict.  
 
The role of human capital in managing contextual conflict was again critical. In sample firms 
where conflict was avoided, the entrepreneurs established the abilities and motivations of VC 
investors, discussed potential problem areas in advance and then worked together to 
neutralize potential disagreements. These entrepreneurs were prepared to acknowledge that 
VCs offer generic strategic skills that cross continents.  We propose that a key component of 
human capital in China is the ability to accept and act upon external advice, although some 
firms insisted on retaining control over certain decisions. These approaches to countering 
contextual conflict helped the sample firms to formulate an appropriate strategic framework, 
while maximising their ability to survive and prosper in the Chinese market.  
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Where contextual conflict did occur, it usually involved disputes between VC investors and 
first-time entrepreneurs over both strategic and operational issues. These firms were forced to 
accept advice perceived as culturally misguided and/or inappropriate for the Chinese market. 
Inexperienced entrepreneurs lacked the capacity to respond to contextual conflict in a positive 
manner by offering a strong entrepreneurial vision or displaying effective negotiation skills. 
Hence we propose: 
Proposition 5a: Entrepreneurs with start-up experience are likely to be effective in 
managing contextual conflict, by adopting a collaborative or an assertive competing 
approach. 
Proposition 5b: Inexperienced entrepreneurs are likely to pursue strategies of passive 
accommodation or open avoidance in managing contextual conflict.  
 
In considering the resolution of procedural disputes, it was difficult for the authors to isolate 
actions undertaken solely in response to procedural conflict; nevertheless, the analysis below 
sheds important new light on this source of discord. By and large, the greater the human 
capital possessed by an entrepreneur, the greater the capacity to develop effective 
communications with VCs. Experienced entrepreneurs recognized the importance of frequent 
communication with investors (through formal and informal channels), not only to reduce the 
prospect of misunderstandings but also to increase the scope for the fruitful exchange of 
ideas. It was also critical to confront any problems quickly. Communication problems were 
minimised through co-operation and the creation of ample opportunities to explain, exchange, 
share and discuss operational and strategic issues with the investors.  
In contrast, first-time entrepreneurs struggled to establish effective communication systems 
with their VC investors. Despite the existence of standard communication channels (such as 
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quarterly board meetings), these mechanisms served only to generate negativity and mistrust. 
It is thus no surprise that inexperienced entrepreneurs found it very difficult to resolve 
procedural conflict.  Our study revealed that avoidance tended to be employed more 
frequently in response to procedural conflict. There was some evidence of accommodation 
strategies being implemented, but avoidance was the more prevalent reaction, especially 
where there was acceptance of the status quo and little desire to tackle procedural conflict. 
Hence we propose: 
Proposition 6a: Entrepreneurs with start-up experience are likely to be effective in 
managing procedural conflict, by adopting collaborative and proactive strategies.  
Proposition 6b: Inexperienced entrepreneurs are likely to be ineffective in managing 
procedural conflict, by pursuing an avoiding approach.  
 
By conducting a systematic and detailed analysis of the E-VC relationship from the 
perspective of the entrepreneurs, our study contributes to the existing literature in several 
ways. First, this study complements previous studies conducted from the perspective of VCs. 
We offer new insights into how the sources of conflict are influenced by the different cultural 
contexts of entrepreneurs and also their differing characteristics. Second, by adopting a 
combined conceptual perspective which embraces the literature on human capital and conflict 
management, we extend previous studies by providing fresh evidence that the human capital 
of entrepreneurs plays a vital role in shaping the E-VC relationship. By investigating how 
human capital acquired over time affects entrepreneurial responses to conflict with their VCs, 
we add a new dimension to studies of entrepreneurial experience.  
The findings from the study also have important managerial implications. First, entrepreneurs 
need to be sensitive towards differences in value systems and in ways of communicating. 
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While some studies have found evidence of cultural convergence between the West and China 
(House et al., 2002), we contend that entrepreneurs need to be equipped with appropriate 
skills to manage cultural differences in the E-VC relationship and hence to respond to conflict 
in an effective manner. Second, the findings should raise awareness among entrepreneurs that 
they can employ a variety of approaches in handling conflict with VCs. Entrepreneurs should 
be encouraged to adopt a collaborative strategy in the management of procedural conflict; if 
inexperienced entrepreneurs received training in, for example, communication and negotiation 
skills, this should enable them to utilise the expertise of the VCs more effectively, as well as 
increasing their chances of securing VC in future.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Adopting a qualitative analysis, this study examines the sources of conflict between 
entrepreneurs and VCs, as well as factors affecting conflict resolution. Communication 
barriers and different value systems are the main sources of conflict between Chinese 
entrepreneurs and VCs, especially foreign VCs. Our findings show that entrepreneurs with 
start-up experience are able to manage conflict more constructively in an assertive and co-
operative manner, whereas inexperienced entrepreneurs tend to be rather passive, resorting to 
accommodating and/or avoiding approaches to resolving conflict. Our results show that the 
approach and attitude of an entrepreneur, mainly shaped by human capital, affect the investee 
firm’s strategic responses to managing conflict; the implication is that individuals with 
broader pools of human capital and experience should demonstrate greater flexibility and 
adaptability when managing and resolving conflict. We conclude that a synthesis of the 
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literature in the fields of conflict and human capital offers new insights into the E-VC 
relationship.  
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Table 1: Basic Information about the Participants and the Firms  
 
Firm Industry Founding Year Participant VC  Interview Location 
D  Internet audio 
video 
2005 CEO US VC Beijing 
H  Internet 3D 2005 CEO Japanese VC; Domestic 
Group Firm  
Beijing 
K  Internet search 2006 CTO US VC; Domestic Private 
Firm 
Beijing 
I  Mobile search 2005 CEO US VC Shanghai 
E Internet service 2004 CEO US VC Shanghai 
R DM service 2001 CFO Japanese VC; Domestic 
Private Firm 
Shanghai 
V Software 1995 CEO US VC; HK Public Firm Beijing 
N Software  1994 CFO Singaporean VC; 
Domestic Public Firm; 
Domestic State-owned 
Firm 
Shanghai 
Y Robots  2007 Deputy GM Domestic Private Firm Beijing  
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Table 2: Human Capital of the Interviewed Entrepreneurs  
Firm     Experience Network  
D First-time entrepreneur  Former classmates form the founding team; 
limited networks  
H  90s: Manager of an Internet firm; 
00s: Started an online book firm  
Well-known in internet sector; connections 
with VC community; friends from previous 
internet ventures form the founding team; 
K   First-time entrepreneur Classmates form the founding team; limited 
network involvement  
I  Over 15 years management 
experience in high-tech industry, 
including 9 years in Great China 
region; 
Worked for a large MNE in 90s 
when it established a subsidiary in 
Shanghai; 
Started two firms in US in 00s 
Previous colleague at the MNEs form the 
founding team; good connections with US 
VC community 
E First-time entrepreneur Some connections with US VC community 
R   Worked for a large domestic firm in 
90s in message servicing sector. 
Started up business in customer 
databases in late 90s. 
 
Previous contact with VCs; Leading firm 
position in the industry 
V Worked for a large domestic firm in 
90s in software industry; 
Started up two businesses in 90s 
Well-known in software industry; good 
connections with VC community; contacts 
with previous colleagues, classmates and 
other players in the industry, both in China 
and the US 
N 90s started up first business in IT 
equipment. 
00s started up firm in software 
industry 
Leading firm position in the market; 
previous contacts with VCs  
Y First-time entrepreneur Some domestic networks and contacts  
  
 
